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Douglas M. Black, Collection Development Librarian, Northern Michigan University

Abstract
This talk explores some of the philosophical issues surrounding the nature of the scholarly record and current
challenges in academic libraries. The discussion arises from a 2011 Chronicle of Higher Education feature on a
widely influential 1979 article entitled “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Making Under Risk,” which
proposed a new model for how people assess risk and weigh decision factors. The theory has been applied to
dozens of disciplines and cited thousands of times, and it has applications in academic collection
development as well as everywhere else. It addressed the limitations of Utility Theory, which grew out of
Pascal’s Wager (i.e., it’s safer to bet on the existence of God), but didn’t adequately explain how people—
gamblers and insurance buyers, for instance—actually weigh risks and make decisions. The pace of change
and new demands facing libraries offer the opportunity to ask new questions about the nature of the
scholarly record. Increasing ubiquity and transience of information, along with rapidly shifting notions of
authorship and ownership, offer some interesting questions about the role of academic library collections in
scholarly communication as a whole.

Introduction
In the academic library, we all know how difficult
it’s become to keep up with increasingly rapid
developments in information, and our current
environment challenges our basic notions of what
constitutes the human record (disclaimer:
terminology here deliberately ignores the
difference between “human record” and
“scholarly record”). We feel increasingly like we’re
doing a lot of betting, and I’m going to explore
here the nature of that betting in the context of
what we’ve traditionally thought of ourselves as
doing. One way of understanding the problem is
to consider ubiquity and transience.

Ubiquity
Here’s what we usually think of when we think of
the scholarly conversation over the centuries. I’ve
often used it in instruction sessions to help
students think about attributing and synthesizing
source material. It’s the standard view of how our
understanding of the solar system developed.
1. Ptolemy, the 2nd century Alexandria
astronomer, formulated a geocentric theory
of the universe, in which the sun and the
other planets orbit around the Earth.
Copyright of this contribution remains in the name of the author(s).
http://dx.doi.org/10.5703/1288284315123

2. Copernicus, in the 16th century, came up with
the heliocentric theory that all the planets
orbit around the Sun.
3. In the early 17th century, Galileo (1564–1642)
aligned his views with Copernicus but
couldn’t fully prove it by observation.
4. Around the same time, Johannes Kepler
(1571–1630) worked out some laws of
planetary motion, continuing the work of his
mentor Tycho Brahe.
5. Late in the 17th century, Isaac Newton did his
work on gravity and showed its consistency
with Kepler’s work on planetary motion,
confirming Copernicus and Galileo.
This sequence is one example of the long scholarly
conversation into which we invite our students.
We invite them into scholarly discourse and begin
training them to think about how ideas connect,
how we know what we know both as individuals
and as humans, and how we advance what we
know both individually and collectively (Berrett,
2012). As we draw students in and forward, we
engage them in creating new knowledge. That
process, fundamental to the academy, lies at the
heart of the problems facing the academic library,
so long considered the repository of the scholarly
record.
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In 2011, the Chronicle of Higher Education (“The
reach of ‘Prospect theory’”) charted the spread of
an article called “Prospect theory: An analysis of
decision under risk” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
The Chronicle feature showed the increasing rate
of citations in a number of diverse disciplines. At
the time, the Chronicle estimated that the
Kahneman and Tversky article had been cited
some 8,000 times.
However, we can’t collect all of that information,
especially not at below R1 level—and R1s can’t
keep up either. In the small regional university
library, where we explicitly focus on providing a
representative, not comprehensive, collection, we
can’t keep up with what we feel we ought to be
collecting. However, consider the academic trend
(in the humanities, mainly) in the last few years
toward emphasizing primary-source documents.
Consider the proportion of the human production
of knowledge that we’ve recorded and preserved
over time, against the proportion of materials that
we’ve never captured for preservation, especially
primary materials: everyday shopping lists, letters,
handbills, theatre programs, petitions, windshield
flyers, all the gray literature that’s gotten away,
receipts, S&H Green Stamp booklets, chain letters,
all the e-mails...when we consider everything
we’ve created against what we’ve managed to
preserve, what becomes clear is that we’ve only
ever preserved a fraction of it to begin with
(Anderson, 2011).
When ideas spread comparatively slowly and
publication technology was comparatively
expensive, it seemed realistic to think that we
could keep track of human knowledge. But now, a
given scholar in a given field can’t possibly read
and absorb everything written in her field
anymore, and studies are showing that scholars
are reading and citing differently now
(McClanahan et al., 2010). Put simply, it’s too
much. When information products were valued in
part based on their scarcity, then especially,
collecting on behalf of a community made sense;
first, because the collection itself represented the
record of the community; second, few if any
community members could afford to gain access
to all of it on their own; and third, because even
though it was growing, the sum total of the

344

Charleston Conference Proceedings 2012

materials being produced appeared that it would
always be a relatively finite, comprehensible set of
objects.
So here, let’s take another look at astronomic
research and advances over the centuries. The
most important clue to the truth lies in the
millennium and a half between Ptolemy and
Copernicus, which are just the most commonly
recognized names. There were more, many more:
• Ptolemy 100–178 AD
• Abu Mashar, 805 or 806–886 AD
• Donnolo, Shabbetai 913–ca. 982
• Alhazen, 965–1039
• Petrus Alfonsi 1062–1110?
• Roger of Hereford fl. 12th cent.
• Gervase of Canterbury ca. 1141–ca. 1210
• Grosseteste, Robert 1175?–1253
• Levi ben Gershom 1288–1344
• Ibn al-Sh� ạtir, ʿAl �ı ibn Ibr̄ah� ım, 1304–1375
• Heybech, Nikolaus von fl. 1389–1444
• Al-Ahdab, Ishak ben Shlomo fl. 1396–ca. 1429
• Zidek, Pavel 1413–1471
• Moncada, Guglielmo Raimondo de ca. 1450–
ca. 1489
• Copernicus 1473–1543
• Martin Luther 1483–1546
• Leoninus, Albertus 1534–1614
• Brahe 1546–1601
• Galileo 1564–1642
• Kepler 1571–1630
• Newton 1642–1727
Obviously, we know even these names only
because some form of their work, or reference to
it, has survived. But not many people outside the
history of science, astronomy, or other related
fields would recognize all of them.

Add to this ubiquity the much more recent
decentralization of information creation, with
users becoming creators as well; now that
everyone is a producer of information, our sense
of finity and control in the bibliographic world is
truly obliterated. But perhaps that sense of finity
and control was illusory all along. How many more
people were active in astronomy over the
centuries whose work has not survived or has not
been widely known enough to be catalogued?
How would we know?
So we probably never did collect enough to
preserve the human record in anything like the
comprehensiveness we’d like to think. That
realization is emerging only now that we’re aware
of how much we can’t collect because of our
current circumstances and how rapidly they have
developed.

Transience
Following indirectly from information ubiquity is
its transience or impermanence. For example, one
recent work about YouTube constitutes a “book”
entirely online (Juhasz, 2011), under the ongoing
control of the contributors. It’s not only a
treatment of YouTube, but a manifestation of its
own subject. There’s an interesting wrinkle here
that’s not immediately evident. This work’s
significance is less about its form or its YouTube
focus than the questions it forces regarding peer
review and evaluating scholarship: The content of
this online book isn’t fixed. The students own the
pieces they’ve produced and can remove their
material any time. Juhasz knows that’s likely to
happen and notes that replacement content can
always be added to fill the gaps (Parry, 2011).
Our most traditional methods of assessment, on
the other hand, have always assumed static
content, in that a printed volume read 2 years ago
will still have the same text and illustrations next
year. We often review new scholarly work by
placing it in context with the existing literature. As
material and content become more ubiquitous
and distributed, however, distinctions blur; If the
work can change so substantially, beyond the
usual range of updating editions, what are we
really evaluating? The enduring value of the
content, the impact of its production as a

phenomenon, or the contemporaneous quality of
its conception and execution? If “the book is so
temporary” (Parry), then on what do we rely for
assessing the quality of the scholarship? Five or
ten years after its initial review, its composition
will probably have changed, so what might its
peer-reviewed status mean over time? Is it simply
a new edition that calls for a new peer review? If
it’s intended in the first place to be impermanent,
should review take into account the work’s
purpose? Would the fact that it has changed later
on mean that it had successfully fulfilled its
purpose, even if the content were no longer the
same? It is more akin to a juried performance, or
is it something else altogether? If we consider it
critical material, then later on, when it becomes
part of the existing literature, how does its
transient nature affect our evaluation of still
newer work to be compared to it? How do we
begin reenvisioning our methods of evaluating
scholarly work created under new publication
models like this one?
When the primary material is ephemeral, not
merely uncertain of access due to format, but
ephemeral in its content by explicit design, what
happens to our own critical distance? What are
the broader implications for scholarly
communication over time? What distinctions do
we draw between object and form or method?
What remains, and in what ways does it matter
what remains?
For scholars of art and architecture, the latter
questions aren’t new. For scholarly
communication in general, Juhasz (2011) is
fascinating partly because it raises so sharply the
question of what a work is and demonstrates how
fluid even basic precepts can become. Those
precepts might have always been rather more
fluid than we’ve been aware, simply because of
the nature of publishing and the pace of
advancement until recently.
Which brings us back to “Prospect Theory”
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This article is
important because it presented a brand-new
theory on how people calculate the likelihood
against the consequences of various alternative
outcomes. Utility theory arose out of Pascal’s
Wager. In a possibly outrageous
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oversimplification, the question Pascal posed was
whether to believe in God. The reasoning goes like
this: If I choose to wager against God existing, I
can have a good time on Earth but risk eternity in
Hell if I’m wrong. If I’m right that God doesn’t
exist, I lose nothing in the long run. If I choose to
wager that God exists, I stand to gain eternity in
Heaven in return for living according to God’s law.
If I’m wrong that God exists, I don’t gain anything
in the long run, and I’ve given up a lot of pleasure
on Earth. Rationality dictates that I wager for
God’s existence, since the utility of the Heaven
prospect after a righteous lifetime outweighs the
utility of pleasure on Earth with the possibility of
eternal Hell.
Utility theory, however, didn’t seem to account
consistently enough for how people actually made
decisions that carried risk (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979, p. 263), such as in gambling and purchasing
insurance. When probability and rates of return
are involved, such calculations as Pascal’s aren’t
so simple. “Prospect Theory” closely examined
probability and perceived probability via a number
of experiments and games investigating how
people responded to specific scenarios.
One example from Kahneman & Tversky (1979) is
the concept of probabilistic insurance. In the
standard system, you purchase home insurance
against the risk of fire. The insurance company is
betting that nothing will happen to the home, and
you’re betting that something will happen. If the
premium is as much or more than the cost of a
potential loss, purchasing the insurance doesn’t
make sense. Put this way, utility theory seems
adequate to explain the decision.
The idea of probabilistic insurance illustrates more
clearly how people actually think about insurance.
The homeowner’s choices are modified to
introduce a second layer of risk independent of
the risk of fire: Pay half the premium, and there’s
a 50% chance that a loss will be covered. If it is
covered, then you pay the other half of the
premium and the company pays for the loss. If it
isn’t covered, you get your money back and pay
for the loss yourself. What determines whether
the loss is covered is unrelated to the risk of fire;
the article’s example is that if the fire occurs on an
odd-numbered day of the month, it’s covered, so
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you pay the other half of the premium and you’re
covered. If the fire occurs on an even-numbered
day, you get the premium back but no coverage
(pp. 269–270). Kahneman & Tversky explain that
“expected utility theory...implies that probabilistic
insurance is superior to regular insurance.”
However, regular insurance eliminates all the risk
of loss from the fire, whereas probabilistic
insurance actually introduces additional risk (p.
270).
In short, we might believe we’re making a choice
between clear alternatives, with careful
consideration of utility and likelihood, but very
often, our choices merely minimize risk instead of
eliminating it—and sometimes even increase it.
We often do think in terms of gambling against
the unforeseeable, but we don’t always realize
that that’s what we’re doing. The way we make
decisions, in other words, isn’t always what we
think it is.
In the academic library, our traditional method of
selecting and acquiring was in case something
would be needed, based on our particular
institution’s mission and our knowledge of
historical and/or current instruction and research.
The large research libraries were thought of as the
repository of the human record, preserving
collected human knowledge for posterity. In
smaller institutions, we’ve aimed for
representative, not comprehensive, collections,
partly because comprehensive collecting has been
completely beyond our fiscal reach. The idea was
to purchase what we could afford and what we
really needed, creating an adequate basis for
ongoing scholarly activity on our own campuses.
Yet we still thought of our libraries as the official
repository of human knowledge, and in acting
conservatively just in case, we all too frequently
engaged in what we thought was Pascal’s Wager.
For example, cancelling newspaper microfilm
because the title was available via an aggregator
and having the publisher cancel its contract with
that vendor years later. We might be said to have
made what we thought was a simple utility
decision, choosing the greatest benefit from
amongst the alternatives by saving money and
providing better access. The decision turns out
later to have been a gamble, and a losing one at

that, given the astronomical cost of acquiring the
material retrospectively. But this particular losing
gamble is less a matter of underestimating risk
than of not understanding that it existed in the
first place, which is exactly what happens when
we purchase insurance thinking that we’re
eliminating all risk. The decision appears to be a
simple utility-theory calculation. However,
Pascal’s Wager identified a positive utility for only
one decision/outcome set, with the others all
neutral or negative. Deciding where to invest
resources in a zero-sum situation, on the other
hand, offers both positive and negative utility for
each decision/outcome pair. The various apparent
risks and benefits don’t always weigh clearly one
way or another on the scales.
What we haven’t understood in the academic
library is where we inadvertently introduce risk in
our decision making. The changes we’re now
seeing in the publishing industry are making some
of those risks clearer, and most of us grasp them
better now; we know more about what questions
to ask when allocating resources or negotiating
for access to electronic materials in particular. We
know now that access via an aggregator is less
reliable than direct subscription, even if the
aggregator appears more cost-effective. We know
now that as print journals cease or move to online
only by the dozen, we’re getting nervous about
retaining access over the long term. We know
now that there’s even a lot of uncertainty
underlying our purchases of materials even with
explicit perpetual-access rights directly from the
publisher, and we know that those purchases are
still something of a gamble. We don’t have any
way of hedging our bets, but at least we now
know that we’re betting in more complex ways
than we thought.
Understanding how we actually make decisions in
uncertain cases is what Kahneman and Tversky
were getting at. Reading that article first probably
wouldn’t have changed our New York Times
decision, since nobody knew what the risks might
be, but reading it now helps us understand the
decision. It also helps us examine new decisions
with a better sense of how we’re likely to weigh
the factors and what unknowns to think about
going forward.

In the world of academic collection management,
we have decisions to make every day in times and
conditions of what we consider grave risk in the
broader cultural arena, and in the context not
only of what we do historically, but of our
historical sense of what we do. In the academic
library, we all recognize that we can’t adequately
absorb and respond to current and future changes
either physically or fiscally. We can step out and
lead in some ways, but on our campus, at least,
our primary mission is to support our own
curriculum and research, which means we have to
retain some significant measure of reactivity.
We all hear the constant calls to embrace change
better in order to preserve the profession, the
institution, and its relevance, all alongside a sense
of impending disaster for the human record. I
wonder whether we might try asking different
questions. We can no longer afford to preserve
the human record adequately, but it’s not
necessarily clear that we ever actually did that.
And given the whiplash changes in information
formats, production, usage, and lifecycles, what
happens if we try to conceive instead of our
ongoing role in scholarly communication as that of
mediators and facilitators, rather than as keepers
or curators? Selecting materials has always meant
mediating, and providing access has always meant
facilitating; that’s part of what we know we’ve
been doing all along. We’ve also long felt that our
central role was to preserve the human record.
What I suggest here is that the nature of the
human record may be fundamentally changing,
and it may have been changing for as long as
we’ve had the concept of a human record. We’re
noticing it only now that change has accelerated
and accelerated so rapidly. Adapting to such
changes means accepting some changes in our
identity and self-image, but maybe only the parts
that have been illusory or ephemeral all along.
Choices remain, and to make them as effectively
as possible, we should consider that our decision
making involves more uncertainty than we’ve long
thought. With new understanding of how we
make our choices, we might need to accept that a
certain amount of letting go is the best way to
hold on.
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